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In B ank.

May 15, 1962.]

Estate of JOSEPH GILMAKER, Deceased. JOSEPH
LOUIS GII-lMAKER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BANK
OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
[L. A. No. 26186.

In Bank.

May 15, 1962.]

Estate of JOSEPH GILMAKER, Deceased. JOSEPH
LOUIS GILMAKER, Contestant and Appellant, v.
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, etc., Petitioner and
Respondent.
[1] Trusts-Removal of Trustee-Jurisdiction: Appeal.-Where in

probate proceedings a life beneficiary's notice of motion to
remove 11. trustee and the supporting affidavit fully set forth
the facts relied on for relief, the trustee appeared and defended on the merits, and the other beneficiaries were not indispensable parties, the notice of motion and supporting affidavit coupled with the trustee's appearance were sufficient to
invoke the trial court's general equity jurisdiction, and its
order denying' the motion was appealable as 11. final judgment.
[2] ld.-Management of Trust Property-Deposit of Trust Funds.
-Under a trust instrument requiring the trustee to keep no
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trusts, ~ 217; Am.Jur., Trusts, § 370.
McK. Dig. References: [I, 4-6] Trusts, § 200; [2] Trusts, § 216;
[3] Tru~ts , § 354.
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[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]
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[57 C.2d

lllorc funds in one bank than wa s insured by the Federal
Dcposit Insnrance Corporation, thc t rustcc was undcr a duty
to place thc funds in ynrious ins tituti ons where they would be
fully insured by such corporll tion, though instructions given
by the life beneficiary, as a con sultnnt, to deposit the money
in designated savings and loan associations were insufficient.
ld.-Accounting by Trustee.-Under a trust instrument requiring the trustee to provide thc life beneficiary, who was also
appointed by the trust ins trulllcnt as consultant, with a
semiannual accounting of receipts and disbursements for each
parcel of real estate in the trust, which the trustee agreed
to do, the trustee could not thereafter contend that such service was unusual or special.
ld.-Removal of Trustee-Grounds.-Hostility between beneficiary and trustee is a ground for removal of the trustee when
the hostility impairs the proper administration of the trust.
ld.-Removal of Trustee-Hostility.-Where the proper administration of a trust required that there be no hostility between the trustee and the beneficiary-consultant, and whel'tl
the latter owned an undivided half interest in property the
other half of which was in the trust, and he had experienctl
managing the entire property before the death of the trustor,
his task as consultant was to advise, not simply passively to
concur or veto, the trustee did not have the sole power to
propose the investment and reinvestment of trust funds, and
a close working arrangement was called for between trustee
and consultant.
ld.-Removal of Trustee-Discretion of Court.-Although the
removal and substitution of a trustee is largely within the
discretion of the trial court, where it was undisputed that
the trustee failed to disperse surplus cash and failed to provide a segregated semiannual accounting, as was required by
the trust instrument, and where the trustee's only defense,
which was insufficient, was that it was not legally obligated
to do either, the hostility between trustee and beneficiary im·
paired the proper administration of the trust and required
the removal and substitution of the trustee.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denying removal and substitution of a trustee
of a testamentary trust and instructing such trustee. George
Francis· and Beach Vasey, Judges. Reversed.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trusts, § 166 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trusts, §§ 128,
130.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Eric A. Rose and Pray, Price & Williams for Appellant.
Johnson & Johnson and George R. Johnson for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In his will Joseph Gilmaker created a
testamentary trust. Under the terms of the trust instrument,
which was incorporated in the final decree of distribution,
the Bank of America is to serve as trustee and petitioner
Joseph Louis Gilmaker is to be the sole life beneficiary.
On his death the remainder is to go to petitioner's wife and
children. Petitioner is also appointed by the trust instrument
as" Consultant, and the Trustee shall not sell, lease, exchange,
hypothecate, or improve any property which is a part of the
trust estate, or invest or reinvest any trust estate funds until
it has first notified said Consultant in writing of its intention
to so act and received from said Consultant his written
approval of the action so proposed."
A large part of the trust property is undivided one-half
interests in parcels of real property, the other one-half of
which is owned by petitioner. The trust instrument provides
that "The trustee shall not maintain in anyone bank or
branch thereof a cash balance of more than the maximum
balance insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, but shall distribute trust funds among as many banks
as necessary to secure full protection against loss through
bank failure." The trustee, however, "shall accept and
comply with any instructions of defendant's said son, JOSEPH
LOUIS GILMAKER, relating to the selection of banks in which
such deposits are to be made." The trustee is also to provide
the consultant "semi-annually with an itemized statement
setting out income and expense for each parcel of improved
real estate in the trust estate, and [he] shall be consulted
regarding the amount of fire and other insurance carried on
each parceL"
Petitioner moved for the removal and substitution of the
trustee. He alleged in his motion, and stated in his affidavit,
that the trustee had maintained $49,000 in one bank account;
that the trustee has refused to provide him with the semiannual accounting, called for by the trust instrument; and
that the trustee has refused to consult with him as provided
in the trust instrument. The motion for removal was denied.
In a separate proceeding the trustee sought instructions concerning its power. The trial court found that the "trustee
has the sole power to propose the investment and re-investment
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of trust funds" subject to the approyal of the consultant.
Petitioner appeals from the order denying removal and the
order instructing the trustee.
In Estate of Schloss, 56 Ca1.2<l 248, 253-256 [14 Cal.Rptr.
643, 363 P.2d 875], we hcld that the superior court sitting
ill probate has no jurisdidion to remove a trustee of a testamentary trust after distribution (see Prob. Code, §§ 11201130) and that the court's power to remove such a trustee
must be exercised pursuant to its general equity jurisdiction.
(See Civ. Code, § 2283.) In support of this conclusion we
pointed out that the Legislature made no provision for an
appeal from an order in probate removing a trustee. (See
Prob. Code, § 1240.) The trustee contends, therefore, that
the trial court did not err in denying petitioner's motion in
the probate proceedings to remove it as trustee and that the
appeal from that order must be dismissed. In the Schloss
case, however, the trustees raised the question of jurisdiction
by demurring to the petition for their removal in the trial
court, and that question was the principal issue on appeal
In the present case, the trustee did not object in the trial
court to its assumption of jurisdiction and did not raise the
question on appeal until after the appeal was decided by the
District Court of Appeal and a hearing was granted in this
court. [1] Petitioner's notice of motion to remove the
trustee and its supporting affidavit fully set forth the facts
relied upon for relief, the trustee appeared and defended
on the merits, and the other beneficiaries were not indispensable parties. (Bowles Y. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.2d 574,
584 [283 P.2d 704].) Under these circumstances the notice
of motion and supporting affidavit coupled with the trustee's
appearance were sufficient to invoke the trial court's general
equity jurisdiction (In re Estate of Thompson, 101 Cal. 349,
353-354 [35 P. 991, 36 P. 98, 508] ; In re Estate of De Leon,
102 Cal. 537, 541 [36 P. 864] ; In re Estate of Clary, 112 Cal.
292,294-295 [44 P . 569] ; Faxon Y. A.ll Persons, 166 Cal. 707,
712 [137 P. 919, L.R.A. 1916B 1209]; see also Sehlyen Y.
Schlyen, 43 Ca1.2d 361, 378 [273 P .2d 897] ; Coons v. Henry,
186 Cal.App.2d 512, 519 [9 Cal.Rptr. 258] ; Estate of 1\Iullins.
190 Cal.App.2d 413, 417-418 [12 Cal.R.ptr. 3]; Phillips y.
Beilsten, 164 Cal.App.2d 450, 457-458 [330 P.2d 912]; cf.
Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 597 [69 P. 412] ; King Y. Chase,
159 Cal. 420, 424-425 [115 P. 207]), and its order denying
petitioner's motion is appealable as a final judgment in the
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963, subd. 1.)
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Petitioner contenus that the trustee violated its duty by
maintaluing $49,000 in one bank account and by refusing to
provide a particularized semiannual accounting. He furtli('r
contends that hostility and disagreement between him and
the trustee prevcnts the consultation the testator considered
essential to the proper administration of the trust. The trustee
contends that it is willing to follow petitioner's suggestions
concerning the deposit of the $49,000, but that the petitioner
has thus far suggested only savings and loan associations and
not banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and that it is willing to make the kind of semiannual
accounting called for by the trust instrument but that such
an accounting would be an extraordinary service for which
it would charge an extraordinary fee. The trustee further
contends that all its suggestions for investment have been
prudent; that the consultant's only function is to veto and
not to advise; and that whatever hostility exists between the
trustee and the consultant has not impaired the proper administration of the trust.
[2] By maintaining $49,000 in cash in one trust account
the trustee failed to follow the trust directions. Under the
trust instrument the trustee could keep no more funds in one
bank than was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
insures a maximum of $10,000 of any trust estate deposited
in a bank. (12 U.S.C.A., § 1817(i).) It is true that the
instructions given by the consultant to deposit the money
in designated savings anu loan associations were insufficient.
Savings and loan association accounts can be insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, not by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (Sec 12 U.S .C.A.,
§§ 1724 et seq.; 12 U.S.C.A., §§ 1811 et seq.) Eyen in the
absence of sufficient directions from the consultant, however,
the trustee was under the duty to place the funds in various
institutions where they would be fully insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. [3] Furthermore, the trustee was under a duty to provide the consultant with a semiannual accounting of receipts and disbursements for each
parcel of real estate in the trust. It may be, as the trustee
contends, that usually such an accounting is extraordinary
and that its practice is to report the receipts and disbursements for the entire trust without segregating the parcels.
In the trust instrument, however, the trustee expressly agreed
to provide a segregated accounting. The annual compensation
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of the trustee is to be three-quarters of one per cent of the
r easonable value of the trust estate, and "For any un usual
or special services, a reasonabl e additional cOJ:1peusatioll."
The trustee cannot now contend that a service it expressly
agreed to provide is unusual or special.
[4] Hostility between the henefi ciary and the trust ee
is a ground for removal of the trustee wh en the hostility impairs the proper administrati on of the trust. ( B rown Y.
Memorial Nat . Home Founda.tion, 162 Cal.App.2d 513, 53-1
[329 P.2d 118, 75 A .L .R.2d 427] ; Ov crcll v. Ov erell, 78 Cal.
App. 251, 258-260 [248 P. 310]; V est v. Bialson, 365 Mo.
1103, 1121-1122 [293 S.W.2d 369] ; Rest., Trusts, § 107, com .
c; 1 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.), p. 778; B ogert on Trusts (2d
ed.), § 527, pp. 376-378.)
The hostility between the trustee and petitioner has been
constant and intense. There has been disagr eement over the
investment of the surplus cash ; over who should collect the
rents from the real property; and over the kind of insurance
to carryon the property. At one time, according to uncon tradicted testimony, one of the trustee's senior trust officers
told petitioner : "Now, listen here. You've been coming down
here at least once a week bothering us and you do not have
to come back any more. I'11 put a stop to this and we'11 petition the Court for instructions relating to the investments."
[5] The proper administration of the trust requires that
there be no hostility between the trustee and the beneficiaryconsultant. '" Consultant' means a person not a trustee
designated in a trust to advise or direct the trustee in r espec t
of any matters or things conn ected with the trust, or "hose
consent or approval is required to purchases, sales, exchanges, or other transactions on the part of the trustee."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1700.6.) Petitioner is not only appointrd
a consultant under the trust, he is also the sole life beneficiary;
he owns an undivided one-half interest in property the other
half of which is in the trust, and he had experience manag iJl!!
the entire property before the death of his father . In these
circumstances the task of the consultant is to advise, not
simply passively to concur or veto. The trustee does not
have, as the instructions of the trial court stated, the "sole
power to pI:opose the investment and re-investment of trust
funds." A close working relationship is called for betwee n
the trustee and the consultant. Furthermore, the organization of the staff of the trustee is not conducive to reestablishing a relationship free from existing hostility. Tru"t de-
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ci~ions are made by the trustee's trust committee. The trust
committee does not meet with outsiders. Thus messages between the trustee and the consultant must pass through a
trust officer, who himself has no power to make decisions.
This conduit mechanism has magnified existing difficulties and
is not likely to improve them.
[6] The removal and substitution of a trustee is largely
within the discretion of the trial court. (Jones v. St1tbbs,
136 Cal.App.2d 490, 501-502 [288 P.2d 939] ; Estate of Keyston, 102 Cal.App.2d 223, 228 (227 P.2d 17].) It is undis·
puted, however, that the trustee failed to disperse the surplus
cash of $49,000 and failed to provide a segregated semiannual
accounting. The trustee's only defense, which is insufficient,
was that it is not legally obligated to do either. The hostility
between the trustee and petitioner has impaired the proper
administration of the trust, and therefore requires the removal
and substitution of the trustee.
The orders denying removal and substitution of the trustee,
and instructing the trustee, are reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred.

